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Abstract
Highly pathogenic influenza A/H5N1 has persistently but sporadically caused human illness and death since 1997. Yet it is
still unclear how this pathogen is able to persist globally. While wild birds seem to be a genetic reservoir for influenza A,
they do not seem to be the main source of human illness. Here, we highlight the role that domestic poultry may play in
maintaining A/H5N1 globally, using theoretical models of spatial population structure in poultry populations. We find that a
metapopulation of moderately sized poultry flocks can sustain the pathogen in a finite poultry population for over two
years. Our results suggest that it is possible that moderately intensive backyard farms could sustain the pathogen
indefinitely in real systems. This fits a pattern that has been observed from many empirical systems. Rather than just
employing standard culling procedures to control the disease, our model suggests ways that poultry production systems
may be modified.
Citation: Hosseini PR, Fuller T, Harrigan R, Zhao D, Arriola CS, et al. (2013) Metapopulation Dynamics Enable Persistence of Influenza A, Including A/H5N1, in
Poultry. PLoS ONE 8(12): e80091. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080091
Editor: Simon Gubbins, The Pirbright Institute, United Kingdom
Received July 27, 2012; Accepted October 8, 2013; Published December 2, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Hosseini et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work is supported by a National Institutes of Health/National Science Foundation Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases award from the
Fogarty International Center 3R01-TW005869, and was conducted in the context of Zoonotic Influenza Collaborative Network, led by the Fogarty International
Center, National Institutes of Health. The Collaborative Network is supported by International Influenza Funds from the Office of the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services. While the funders had no role in data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript, Zoonotic
Influenza Collaborative Network, led by the Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health co-ordinated and participated in the discussions which led
to the study design.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: hosseini@ecohealthalliance.org
Introduction
Highly pathogenic influenza A/H5N1, colloquially referred to
as ‘‘Avian Flu’’, was first identified in Hong Kong in 1997 as a
cause of fatal respiratory illness in humans [1]. After spreading
from Asia to Europe and Africa in 2005, it has persisted since then.
It has been reported from wild waterfowl in Asia [2] and Europe
[3–5], as the cause of outbreaks of poultry disease in Asia, Europe
and Africa [6–12], and as the cause of repeated zoonotic
transmission to humans in Asia, Europe and Africa [13–16].
Although human-to-human transmission is rare, this strain of
avian flu represents a significant pandemic threat, with 360
reported human deaths by the end of 2012 [17], and we now know
artificial selection has been able to create a strain of A/H5N1, that
has only a modicum of mutations from naturally occurring strains,
that can make the virus transmissible among mammals while
remaining pathogenic [18]. Yet it remains unclear why this has not
occurred outside the laboratory. In addition, the case fatality rates
for human A/H5N1 infections remain high [17], as do the
mortality rates in chickens, some breeds of domestic ducks, and
some species of wild birds [19], making control measures difficult
and urgent [20]. Although many agencies and governments have
tried to control A/H5N1 spread with some degree of success, it has
not been eradicated nor displaced by a less pathogenic strain of
Influenza [21,22].
Indonesia, Egypt and Vietnam represent the three main foci of
human A/H5N1, with over 75% of human cases occurring there
[17]. Twelve other countries have reported sporadic and
occasional human cases and 48 additional countries have reported
infected animals [17,23] with no reported spillover to people. Thus
a key question is how A/H5N1 has persisted across the Eastern
Hemisphere, but with only very distinct, geographically disparate
foci of human cases. One explanation for this may be differences
in the nature of poultry farming in affected versus unaffected
countries. In particular, a number of studies have proposed
backyard poultry rearing as a key risk factor for human infection
[8,24–27]. However, many countries that have dense human
populations, extensive backyard poultry rearing, and repeated
presence of A/H5N1, have reported no or only a few human cases
(e.g. Bangladesh, India) [17].
At a large spatial scale, the presence of A/H5N1 in Asia has
been correlated with duck density and rice cropping patterns
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[21,28,29], and its spread has been linked to bird migration and
global poultry trade [30–36]. However, because of high livestock
and human mortality, and the short duration of outbreaks, A/
H5N1 dynamics have been difficult to study. Here we examine the
spatial dynamics of A/H5N1 using theoretical models of disease
spread and attempt to understand its ability to persist in different
types of domestic poultry rearing operations.
It is a well-established theory in ecology that spatial structuring
of a population, as opposed to a single well-mixed population,
may alter dynamics [37,38]. Spatial structure can dampen cycles,
allow for co-existence of pathogens with hosts, and generally
enable the long-term persistence of often lethal pathogens within
a host population [39–41]. Employing a metapopulation
approach has been successfully used to understand the dynamics
of measles in small cities and towns [42], the sporadic nature of
Hendra virus outbreaks [43], rabies in wild and domestic dogs
[44], and cattle diseases [45]. In the current paper, we apply this
understanding specifically to the case of A/H5N1 in domestic
ducks, and poultry more broadly. We will demonstrate that
spatial structuring can allow A/H5N1 to persist for an indefinite
period of time without re-introduction from wild bird popula-
tions. We will also investigate the effects of some possible control
measures, such as culling and cleaning. While these measures
may help reduce the impact and spillover risk of A/H5N1, they
may not be able to eliminate unless the effort put into making
them effective is enormous.
Methods: Model
We designed our model to represent a single species in several
patches (x M {0,…J]}. The model assumes a network of patches,
representing farms, markets, or traders, linked together. Our
model is a stochastic simulation developed using the Gillespie
algorithm [46,47] because we are focused on variability in
persistence, but we present the deterministic skeleton of the model
for simplicity and clarity. Within a patch, the model uses standard
SIR dynamics for each species, with the addition of the presence of
a common environmental reservoir of infection [48]. Within each
patch (x), the dynamics follow these equations:
dSx
dt
~{bSxIx{uSx(1{e
{wVx ){mSx{vSxzV(x,S)
dIx
dt
~zbSxIxzuSx(1{e
{wVx ){(azmzc)Ix{vIxzV(x,I)
dRx
dt
~cIx{mRx{vRxzV(x,R)
dVx
dt
~sIx{gVx:
ð1Þ
Where S represents the number of susceptibles, I infected, R
recovered, and V virions in the environment. The initial
conditions for all simulations are an entirely susceptible popula-
tion, except for two infected individuals, located in two randomly
chosen patches. We have included the indirect transmission model
of Breban et al. [48], where each infected host sheds virus into the
environment at rate (s), and virions in the environment degrade at
rate (g). We use only the only the warm temperature parameter
values (see Table 1), as we are focused here on poultry in
subtropical and tropical environments. Transmission may occur
indirectly from the environment (u), with a dose-dependence of
likelihood of infection (1{e{wVx ), which depends on virion
infectiousness (w). Direct transmission occurs at rate b. Infected
animals recover at rate (c), or die due to the disease at rate (a). In
addition, there may be non-influenza related mortality (m), for all
categories (Sx,Ix,Rx) of animals. We do not include birth, because
for most real poultry systems, chicks are introduced by other
means. Although not shown, the model keeps track of the number
of dead animals from each infection category. For the introduction
of a single infected individual into a fully susceptible population
(S0), without any infectious virions in the environment, this model
has a within-patch basic reproduction number of:
Figure 1. Two example random networks. (A) A Watt-Strogatz
random small world network with 64 vertices, with f= 2.33 and
r= 0.0596 (as in Table 1), (B) A Barabasi random network with 64
vertices, with the power of the preferential attachment set to 0.5 and
the zero appeal to 1.0, both represent a network of 64 farms and
markets, each with 500 animals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080091.g001
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b
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Animals may leave the patch at rate (v) from any class,
presumably by human activity in the case of poultry. Animals that
leave their current patch are then moved to another patch
according to the function:
V(x,N)~
P
y
x(x,y)N D
P
y
x(x,y)~1 ð2Þ
Where x(x,y) represents the probability of movement between
patches x and y, given a departure from patch y, and N represents
the appropriate population (susceptible, infected or recovered),
with the constraint that all x(x,y) must sum to 1 across all possible
source patches. Here we use the row normalized adjacency matrix
of a network model to specify the interconnectedness of the system.
In the absence of relevant empirical data, we have examined two
classic random networks. We have used the Watts-Strogatz
random network model, known as the small-world model with
neighborhood (f) and re-wiring probability for global connections
(r) (e.g., Figure 1a) [49]. In order to examine the impact of
network structure, we have also used a Barabasi random network
(e.g., Figure 1b) [50].
Additionally, we have implemented a model of passive
surveillance based control in the model. If the number of dead
birds within a given period (tCrit) exceeds a threshold (ICrit), it is
presumed an authority would be notified given a probability of
reporting (pReport), and that authority would test the living animals
for infection, with a given probability of detection (pDetect). If the
infection is detected, then all animals can be culled, and/or the
environment cleaned (V set to 0).
Although we have developed a full multispecies model, in order
to focus on the effects of population structure, we limit our
consideration to a single species of farmed livestock, namely ducks
[51,52]. We do examine different parameter values, which cover
the case of chickens as well [53]. We also treat the total population
size as fixed at first. Population size becomes variable as animals
move through the network, increasing as animals move in from
other patches, as well as decreasing due to mortality and animals
moving out of patches. We did this so as not to confound the
results of spatial structure with those of population size. We
generally examine equal initial population sizes, again to focus our
results on structure; but we have looked a few key cases with mixed
population sizes.
Results
Our key finding (Figure 2) is that persistence of A/H5N1 is
highly dependent on farm size. For very small patches, the within-
patch R0 of the pathogen is substantially less than one and most
epidemics fail, i.e. there are no cases of secondary transmission.
This is true across different population structures (Figures S1–S5).
The qualitative result is also robust to different parameter values
(Figures S6–S9) [51–53]. Although truly random networks can
require very large patches for persistence, this may be because the
initial two infected hosts frequently land in patches that are
completely disconnected from the rest of the network, and it is only
once the network is small enough that the infection can actually
spread throughout the network (Figure S2). In contrast, the
transitions are very stark for a pure nearest neighbor network, the
other extreme of the Watts-Strogatz model (Figure S1). The results
are qualitatively robust for the topologically very different Barabasi
network (Figure S3), but this does not alter the general qualitative
conclusions. Including a few larger farms in a matrix of small
farms does not alter the results very much until there is a gigantic
farm, which reduces the variability in outcomes (Figure S4 & S5).
At low patch sizes, if there are some cases of secondary
transmission, the epidemic dies out rapidly due to stochasticity
(e.g., Figure 3a). For very large patches, the within-patch R0 of the
pathogen is so high that the epidemic rapidly burns through the
population, and as long as the network is sufficiently connected
that all patches become infected, they all experience a full
epidemic (e.g., Figure 3c). In instances where patches are of
moderate size however, resulting in R0 values between 1 and
approximately 6, patches experience asynchronous local mini-
epidemics (e.g., Figure 3b), which prolong the global epidemic.
However in these cases, the epidemic doesn’t necessarily infect a
large portion of the population, and if pathogenicity is low, may
not cause noticeable outbreaks. Variation in the rates of direct
transmission, mortality, and recovery, as well as the details of
environmental transmission, can alter the pathogen’s ideal patch
size, but does not change the fundamental result that a
metapopulation of moderate sized farms is best for persistence.
Simple mixed initial population size models, with either one
(Figure S4) or five (Figure S5) larger populations, and several
Table 1. Parameters of the model.
Symbol Value/Range Definition Units Reference
b 0.004 direct transmisison animal21 day21 [73]
u 0–0.167 recovery rate day21 [51–53,73]
a 0–0.4 disease mortality rate day21 [51–53,73]
u 0.001 environmental uptake rate day21 [48]
w 1.96 ? 1024 virion infectiousness virion21 Calculation from [48], ID50 from [74]
n 0.14 virus degradation rate day21 [48]
s 105 shedding rate day21 [48]
v 0.00–0.30 movement rate day21 [59]
f 2 network neighborhood patches –
r 0.0596 re-wiring probability –
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080091.t001
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smaller moderately sized populations (N=250) do not alter the
conclusions until these larger populations are quite large (.5000)
relative to the total population size. Even then, the effect is more to
reduce the variability, rather than a strong alteration of the mean.
This highlights the role that the moderate size farms have in
allowing the epidemic to smolder, even if there are a few large
epidemics in the system without any control measures.
In Figure 4, we implement a control program, namely a passive
surveillance program that culls animals and cleans the environ-
ment when influenza is detected. While these measures can
substantially reduce the total number of individuals infected in
larger patches, they are ineffective at curtailing persistence in a
network of moderate sized populations. Figure S9 demonstrates
that our conclusions are general, although the quantitative details
depend on exact parameters.
Discussion
Our model demonstrates a strong role of farm size in the risk of
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks. Our results
suggest that true small-scale subsistence farming at low densities
has a low risk of HPAI outbreaks, and since the risk of outbreaks is
reduced, the risk of spillover to people should be reduced. These
results run counter to a number of previous studies which have
linked human cases of highly pathogenic A/H5N1 influenza to
Figure 2. For a fixed total single species total population size 32,000, without non-influenza mortality (m=0), the effect of changing
local patch size and patch number on (A) frequency of epidemic failure, (B) median length of epidemic in days, and (C) median total
number of animals infected over 100 simulations. Dotted lines represent the empirical 97.5% and 2.5% percentiles, creating a 95% bootstrap
confidence interval. Other parameters are as in Table 1, including environmental transmission, except a=0.1111, and v= 0.03, without any infection
control program. Gray area represents parameter region where 1,R0,6 within a patch.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080091.g002
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small-scale, backyard poultry operations and proposed that this is
a major risk factor for future spillover events [54–57], however, the
small and moderate scales (discussed below) in our model are
rarely separated in the empirical literature, as both fall into the
FAO/OIE sector 4 designation [58,59]. In most cases, these
studies consist of investigations of human cases, outbreaks, or
policy recommendations based on epidemiological analyses of
these. Thus results here suggest that patchily distributed very
small-scale low density poultry production are insufficient to
sustain epidemics, and a fragmented trade network may instead
reduce the probability of sustained transmission.
As human density increases, patches of poultry likely become
larger – either from the development of modest poultry production
by local entrepreneurs, or because individual family flocks
intermingle so extensively to become a single flock in high-density
environments, or from a mix of these scenarios. In this case, a
smoldering epidemic might allow an HPAI to persist without ever
causing enough livestock mortality to enable effective intervention.
The countries that have had the most reported H5N1 cases share
these characteristics in common, despite geographic distance.
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Egypt have high human population
density, where people raise poultry both for subsistence and for
income, but on a moderately small, household scale [58].
Our modeling work suggests that truly large-scale poultry
production, such as Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
(CAFOs), could reduce the persistence of A/H5N1 by reducing
the likelihood of undetected and under-reported smoldering
epidemics and thus reduce the risk of spillover to humans. A
critical part of this would be a control program that succeeds at
identifying outbreaks in these farms sufficiently early to provide a
public health benefit; otherwise smoldering persistence would
become raging epidemics. Additionally, it would need to be clear
that the advantages from making epidemics more detectable offset
the disadvantage of any increase in the size of epidemics for the
risk of spillover to humans. A small number of studies have
highlighted the lack of biosecurity in intensive poultry farms
[60,61]. However, these studies are focused on developed
countries, where there is an expectation of reliable, advanced
biosecurity, and when lapses are identified, they are considered
significant. In developing countries, the difference in biosecurity
between industrial farms and backyard production is likely far
larger, even if neither is as biosecure as in developed countries.
Here, there are potential practical reasons for a protective role of
large-scale farms. In these developing country large-scale farms,
there is likely to be less trading in and out of the population and far
more surveillance for mortality than in small backyard flocks.
Therefore an HPAI outbreak would be large and noticeable and
therefore more likely to be subject to control measures such as the
de-flocking or mass vaccination strategies used widely in China,
southeast Asia and Egypt [58].
Comparing the results from different network structures, it is
clear that this is an important factor, particularly for systems of
larger farms. A nearest neighbor network (no long-distance links
across the network) produced results almost similar to culling.
However, increasing farm size did reduce persistence in all cases,
albeit with different patterns. Yet the critical threshold farm-size
for enabling persistence was similar across network patterns,
demonstrating that the within patch R0 is the most important
factor for this threshold. Unfortunately, the detailed comparative
data on real trade networks, and poultry farming practices across
countries that would be needed to test this model are currently
lacking, or relatively inaccessible proprietary data, although we are
seeking to collaborate with other groups and nations to obtain this
data, as well as working on our own empirical research.
It is important to note that our model can explain the
persistence of A/H5N1 influenza without invoking repeated
introductions from wildlife, or domestic, reservoirs. Wild water-
fowl harbor a diversity of influenza strains, including A/H5N1,
which has been reported from wild birds in Egypt [62], South Asia
[32], China [2,34,63], Europe [64] and Africa [65,66]. However,
Figure 4. For a fixed total single species total population size
(32,000), without non-influenza mortality (m=0), the effect of
changing local patch size and patch number on (A) frequency
of epidemic failure, (B) median length of epidemic in days, and
(C) median total number of animals infected over 100
simulations. Dotted lines represent the empirical 97.5% and 2.5%
percentiles, creating a 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Here with
control measures implemented, (pReport = 0.9, pDetect = 0.9, tCrit = 1,
ICrit = 5). Gray area represents parameter region where 1,R0,6 within
a patch.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080091.g004
Figure 3. Dynamics over time of for three different simulation runs, solid grey line represents global prevalence of infection across
all patches (farms and markets), colored dashed lines represent abundance of infected individuals within each patch (farm and
market). (A) 1280 patches of size 25, longest simulation run, note only three patches infected, (B) 128 patches of size 250, random simulation run,
note global prevalence always less than 2.5%, (C) 16 patches of size 2000, random simulation run, note near deterministic similarity of epidemic in
each patch.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080091.g003
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while there is evidence for a role of wild birds in the spread and
introduction of A/H5N1 [31], it is not clear what role infected
wild birds play in persistence of HPAIs generally. Our modeling
suggests that the wild birds are not required for persistence, in line
with a recent empirical review by Gauthier-Clerc [67].
Culling remains the most widespread and commonly used
approach for dealing with HPAI infections in endemic countries
[58]. Our model demonstrates the effectiveness of culling in
reducing the number of infected individuals in large poultry
populations. However, neither culling, nor culling and cleaning of
the environment was able to reduce persistence of influenza in our
simulations for metapopulations of moderate sized farms. Our
model results suggest that changes to the type of farms present
within endemic countries would have a more significant impact on
the persistence of HPAI, and therefore the long-term effectiveness
of control programs. In essence, once the protein demands of
country require the intensification of poultry production beyond
subsistence, from an emerging disease risk prospective it may be
best to move to CAFOs as quickly as possible. A preliminary
suggestion in terms of network structure would be to subdivide the
farm to market chain into as many small separate networks as
possible, but this may not be feasible.
In this study, we did not examine the efficacy of vaccination as a
control strategy because of the complexity of escape mutations,
and problems with its long-term use as a control measure
[20,68,69]. Therefore, a model that proposed to examine a
vaccination control strategy would have to include strain variation
and antigenic selection (e.g. [70]), which is beyond the scope of this
work. Future work should investigate the ability of this model to fit
observed dynamics in empirical systems, the potential effects of
variability of initial farm size, and alternate network structure [71],
both empirical and theoretical. This model could be helpful in
optimizing control efforts could potentially yield tremendous
benefits to the poultry industry, as the virus depresses exports in
affected countries, with China and Thailand alone losing $900
million due A/H5N1 from to 2003 to 2005 [72].
Our study demonstrates that moderate size patches of poultry
may substantially contribute to the persistence of influenza in
countries where such production is a dominant force in the poultry
production system. Although passive surveillance and culling may
reduce prevalence, and infection burden, and thus risk of spillover it
is unlikely to eliminate influenza from these countries. Development
of more bio-secure, intensively monitored, larger scale commercial
poultry production may be the best route to risk reduction in
countries with substantial need for intensive poultry production.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Alternate Watts-Strogatz network, here re-
wiring probability r=0, thus only the two nearest
neighbors in either direction are connected, and there
are no random long distance connections across the
network. For a fixed total single species total population size
32,000, without non-influenza mortality (m=0), the effect of
changing local patch size and patch number on (A) frequency of
epidemic failure, (B) median length of epidemic in days, and (C)
median total number of animals infected over 100 simulations.
Dotted lines represent the empirical 97.5% and 2.5% percentiles,
creating a 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Other parameters
are as in Table 1, including environmental transmission, except
a=0.1111, and v=0.03, without any infection control program.
Gray area represents parameter region where 1, R0,6 within a
patch.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Alternate Watts-Strogatz network, here re-
wiring probability r=0, which transforms the network
to an essentially randomly wired network. This can create
sub-networks that are disconnected from the majority of the
network leading to high variability in simulation results, and
pushing the persistence area to very large farm sizes. For a fixed
total single species total population size 32,000, without non-
influenza mortality (m=0), the effect of changing local patch size
and patch number on (A) frequency of epidemic failure, (B)
median length of epidemic in days, and (C) median total number
of animals infected over 100 simulations. Dotted lines represent
the empirical 97.5% and 2.5% percentiles, creating a 95%
bootstrap confidence interval. Other parameters are as in Table 1,
including environmental transmission, except a=0.1111, and
v=0.03, without any infection control program. Gray area
represents parameter region where 1, R0,6 within a patch.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Alternate random network, here a non-
directional Barabasi network [48], with a zero appeal
of 1 and a power of preferential attachment of 0.5. For a
fixed total single species total population size 32,000, without non-
influenza mortality (m=0), the effect of changing local patch size
and patch number on (A) frequency of epidemic failure, (B)
median length of epidemic in days, and (C) median total number
of animals infected over 100 simulations. Dotted lines represent
the empirical 97.5% and 2.5% percentiles, creating a 95%
bootstrap confidence interval. Other parameters are as in Table 1,
including environmental transmission, except a=0.1111, and
v=0.03, without any infection control program. Gray area
represents parameter region where 1, R0,6 within a patch.
(TIF)
Figure S4 Standard small world network (r=0.6), but
there is now one larger farm of variable size. The top row
of the x-axis is the size of the larger patch, while the bottom row is
the number of smaller patches, all of size 250 hosts. Thus the far
left of the graph is the same as for Figure 1 in the main text. For a
fixed total single species total population size 32,000, without non-
influenza mortality (m=0), the effect of changing local patch size
and patch number on (A) frequency of epidemic failure, (B)
median length of epidemic in days, and (C) median total number
of animals infected over 100 simulations. Dotted lines represent
the empirical 97.5% and 2.5% percentiles, creating a 95%
bootstrap confidence interval. Other parameters are as in Table 1,
including environmental transmission, except a=0.1111, and
v=0.03, without any infection control program.
(TIF)
Figure S5 Standard small world network (r=0.6), but
there is now five larger farms of variable size. The top
row of the x-axis is the size of each of the five larger patches, while
the bottom row is the number of smaller patches, all of size 250
hosts. Thus the far left of the graph is the same as for Figure 1 in
the main text. For a fixed total single species total population size
32,000, without non-influenza mortality (m=0), the effect of
changing local patch size and patch number on (A) frequency of
epidemic failure, (B) median length of epidemic in days, and (C)
median total number of animals infected over 100 simulations.
Dotted lines represent the empirical 97.5% and 2.5% percentiles,
creating a 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Other parameters
are as in Table 1, including environmental transmission, except
a=0.1111, and v=0.03, without any infection control program.
(TIF)
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Figure S6 Alternate transmission parameters that more
closely resemble H5N1 infections in chickens with no
recovery and faster mortality [51]. For a fixed total single
species total population size 32,000, without non-influenza
mortality (m=0), the effect of changing local patch size and patch
number on (A) frequency of epidemic failure, (B) median length of
epidemic in days, and (C) median total number of animals infected
over 100 simulations. Dotted lines represent the empirical 97.5%
and 2.5% percentiles, creating a 95% bootstrap confidence
interval. Other parameters are as in Table 1, including
environmental transmission, except b=0.0081, c=0, a=0.32,
and v=0.05, without any infection control program.
(TIF)
Figure S7 Alternate transmission parameters that em-
phasize environmental transmission more and direct
transmission less, with higher mortality. For a fixed total
single species total population size 32,000, without non-influenza
mortality (m=0), the effect of changing local patch size and patch
number on (A) frequency of epidemic failure, (B) median length of
epidemic in days, and (C) median total number of animals infected
over 100 simulations. Dotted lines represent the empirical 97.5%
and 2.5% percentiles, creating a 95% bootstrap confidence
interval. Other parameters are as in Table 1, including
environmental transmission, except b=0.003, u=0.002,
a=0.222, and v=0.143, without any infection control program.
(TIF)
Figure S8 Alternate transmission parameters without
environmental transmission. For a fixed total single species
total population size 32,000, without non-influenza mortality
(m=0), the effect of changing local patch size and patch number
on (A) frequency of epidemic failure, (B) median length of
epidemic in days, and (C) median total number of animals infected
over 100 simulations. Dotted lines represent the empirical 97.5%
and 2.5% percentiles, creating a 95% bootstrap confidence
interval. Other parameters are as in Table 1, excluding
environmental transmission, i.e. u=0.0, without any infection
control program.
(TIF)
Figure S9 Less effective control program, pReport = 0.1,
not 0.9. For a fixed total single species total population size
(32,000), without non-influenza mortality (m=0), the effect of
changing local patch size and patch number on (A) frequency of
epidemic failure, (B) median length of epidemic in days, and (C)
median total number of animals infected over 100 simulations.
Dotted lines represent the empirical 97.5% and 2.5% percentiles,
creating a 95% bootstrap confidence interval. Here with control
measures implemented, (pReport = 0.1, pDetect = 0.9, tCrit = 1,
ICrit = 5).
(TIF)
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